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OVERVIEW — Growing numbers of consumers are in health plans that
give them incentives to be more cost-conscious.  Yet complex pricing sys-
tems and limited information may make it hard to choose among provid-
ers and treatment options.  This report examines steps that insurers and
others have taken to make better price information available, possible gov-
ernment measures to further promote price transparency or to simplify
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Health Care Price Transparency
and Price Competition
Employers, insurers, and policymakers have shown increasing interest in
health benefit plans that are designed to make insured people more cost-
conscious by requiring them to pay a larger share of their own expenses.
Much of the recent discussion has focused on consumer-directed health
plans, which combine a high initial deductible with a savings account
funded through employer and/or enrollee contributions. (Similar prod-
ucts are now available to Medicare beneficiaries.) In addition, many
enrollees in more traditional health insurance plans have faced steadily
rising cost-sharing requirements.
Most people with private insurance now have at least some incentive to
think about possible costs when choosing among available providers or
treatments. Yet their ability to make informed decisions has been limited
by the lack of publicly available information on provider prices and by
complex pricing systems that make it difficult for patients to assess what
they will actually have to pay out of pocket for different courses of care.
In response, many insurers, providers, state and federal agencies, and other
third-party sources are beginning to make some form of price information
available to the general public or to enrollees of a specific health plan.
President Bush has issued an executive order requiring federal health pro-
grams and their contracting health plans to disclose prices to their benefi-
ciaries or participants, and there are many other initiatives to increase “price
transparency” through voluntary or mandatory reporting.1
So far, few of these initiatives provide health plan enrollees the data they
might need to make informed choices among available providers or treat-
ments. Even if more complete information is made available, there is an
ongoing debate over the likely effects of greater transparency in health
care pricing. Some people contend that informed consumers will be more
likely to shop for better values and that providers will respond by com-
peting on price and quality. Others say that these effects are likely to be
limited because health care decisions are complicated and are often made
quickly or at times of great personal stress. In this view, consumers may
not be able or willing to shop for medical care in the same way they do for
other goods and services, and the financial incentives for price-shopping
may not be very strong.
This background paper begins with an explanation of (i) the different kinds
of health care prices and (ii) which kinds of prices are relevant to consum-
ers with different kinds of coverage in different situations. It then reviews
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the price information now being made available to consumers through
public or private sources, along with proposals for broader disclosure and
standardization of pricing systems. Finally, it considers whether the com-
bination of transparency and consumer-directed health plans is likely to
lead to greater price competition among providers.
HEALTH CARE PRICES
Most hospitals, doctors, and other health care providers charge different
prices for different patients, depending on whether they have insurance
coverage and what type of coverage they have. In addition, the actual
amounts paid out of pocket by patients will often depend on whether
they are using a provider who participates in their insurer’s network,
whether their spending has exceeded a plan’s deductible or out-of-pocket
limit, or what type of coinsurance, co-payments, or other cost-sharing their
plan imposes.
Types of Provider Prices
Three different “prices” are potentially relevant in determining what a
consumer must pay for care: provider charges, contract prices negoti-
ated between a health plan and a participating network provider, and
the health plan’s maximum allowance for services obtained from non-
network providers.
Provider Charge – The provider’s “list price” for the service.
The charge is the amount the provider would bill a self-pay patient—
that is, a patient with no insurance or one with a health plan that has
no contract with the provider. In the case of hospitals, charges in 2003-
2004 averaged more than twice the actual cost of furnishing care; 10
percent of hospitals had charges that were four or more times their
costs.2 In practice, uninsured patients rarely pay the full charge. Data
from the 2003 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) indicate that
only 9 percent of hospital inpatients with no insurance or other third-
party payment paid the hospital’s full charges. Two-thirds paid noth-
ing, usually because their charges were written off as charity care or
bad debt.3 Other providers, such as physicians in independent prac-
tice, may also have a standard charge that is higher than the amount
they accept from most patients.
Contracted Price – The maximum amount a participating or net-
work provider has agreed to accept for patients covered by a
particular public program or private health plan.
In the case of Medicare and most Medicaid programs, the administering
agency established payment rates, although some Medicaid programs
Background Paper
March 28, 2007
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 5
negotiate rates with providers for some services. Private health plans
negotiate prices with hospitals and large physician groups; some smaller
practices may be offered a rate on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Both public
and private plans generally require contracting or “participating” pro-
viders to accept the negotiated rate as payment in full. These providers
may collect a co-payment or coinsurance from the patient but may not
“balance bill,” that is, collect from the patient any of the difference be-
tween the contract price and their usual full charge. Medicare allows
limited balance billing by nonparticipating physicians, but not by the
overwhelming majority who are participating or by hospitals.
Contract prices are commonly well below the provider’s listed charge
and may sometimes be less than the actual cost of services. In particular,
providers and private insurers often contend that Medicare and Medic-
aid programs underpay, forcing providers to “cost shift,” or charge pri-
vate payers more for their patients in order to cover losses for public
program patients. These claims are hard to assess because of the limita-
tions of the available data and because public programs’ payment poli-
cies change over time. For example, the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) has estimated that aggregate Medicare payments
to hospitals were greater than costs in 1997–2002 and less than costs in
2003 and 2004.4
Maximum Allowance – The maximum amount the health plan
will pay when a service is obtained from a non-network provider.
This allowance or “charge screen” used by an insurer was once commonly
based on an average of what different providers in the community charged
that insurer for the service. Now insurers may use some other method—
for example, fixing the maximum at some percentage of what Medicare
would allow for the same service. When the maximum allowance set by a
private insurer is less than the provider’s full charge, the provider can bill
the patient for the balance, as well as for any required coinsurance amount.
Public programs usually prohibit or limit balance billing.
Amounts Paid by Health Plan Enrollees
In order to estimate the net amount they will have to pay different pro-
viders for particular services, health plan enrollees need to know not
only provider prices but also their health plan’s payment and cost-
sharing rules.
Traditional health plans — Most people with private insurance are in
plans with some form of provider network. Among workers with em-
ployer coverage, 73 percent were in preferred provider organization
(PPO) or point of service (POS) plans in 2006. These plans allow enroll-
ees to use both network and non-network providers; however, higher
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deductibles and cost sharing apply to non-network services, and enroll-
ees may be subject to balance billing by non-network providers. Another
20 percent of workers were in health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
which provide no coverage for non-network care except in emergencies;
4 percent were in consumer-directed plans, described in the next sec-
tion, most of which also use networks; just 3 percent were still in non-
network “indemnity” plans.5 Indemnity plans may have a network of
providers who have agreed not to balance bill, but
deductibles and coinsurance are the same regard-
less of whether the enrollee uses a network or non-
network provider.
Because PPO plans are most prevalent, it is useful to
look at their payment rules in greater detail. Most
PPOs have an in-network deductible; among those
with a deductible, the average for single employees was $473 in 2006.6
Enrollees in these plans pay network providers the plan’s contract price
(not full charges) for services until the deductible is reached. At that point—
or from the outset, in a plan with no deductible—the enrollee usually pays
a fixed co-payment, commonly $15 or $20, for physician visits; some plans
instead require a coinsurance payment, commonly 20 or 25 percent of the
contract price. (Many plans have separate deductible and coinsurance rules
for inpatient hospital admissions, and nearly all plans have separate cost-
sharing rules for prescription drugs.) Most plans have an annual out-of-
pocket limit, such as $1,500 or $2,000 for a single enrollee. Once the
enrollee’s total payments for deductibles, co-payments, and/or coinsur-
ance during a year reach this limit, the plan pays the full negotiated price
for any subsequent in-network care. (Some plans may not count deduct-
ible payments toward the out-of-pocket limit.)
Enrollees who go outside the network for nonemergency care are penal-
ized in several ways. First, the plan may impose a higher deductible and
require larger coinsurance payments for non-network services. Second,
because there is no contract price for these services, the enrollee will pay
the provider’s full charge until the deductible is reached. Third, in deter-
mining when the deductible has been reached, the plan may count only
its maximum allowance for the service, even if the enrollee has paid the
provider more than this amount. For example, in a plan with a $500 de-
ductible, if a provider charges $750 and the plan’s maximum allowance is
$400, the enrollee might pay the provider $750 and still be $100 short of
meeting the deductible. Finally, once the deductible is reached, the plan
will pay a non-network provider its maximum allowance minus the ap-
plicable coinsurance percentage. The enrollee will then pay the coinsur-
ance amount plus any difference between the maximum allowance and
the provider’s full charge. An enrollee who has reached the out-of-pocket
limit will not pay coinsurance but will still pay the difference between the
allowance and the full charge.
Consumers need to know both pro-
vider prices and their health plan’s pay-
ment rules in order to estimate their
costs for a particular service.
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Table 1 further shows how the choice between network and non-
network providers can affect a patient’s out-of-pocket costs under a hy-
pothetical PPO plan. In this example, Zelda has received an outpatient
diagnostic procedure, followed by outpatient surgery. Charges for the
latter include the surgeon’s fee and a facility charge by a hospital or am-
bulatory surgical center.
TABLE 1
Comparison of Patient Costs for In-Network and Out-of-Network Services in Hypothetical PPO Plan
IN-NETWORK SERVICES
After a $500 deductible, the patient pays $15 for each physician service; outpatient facility costs are covered in full.
Provider Contract
In-Network Services Charge Price  Patient Pays Plan Pays
Outpatient Diagnostic Procedure $ 750 $ 400 $ 400 $ 0
toward deductible
Outpatient Surgery $ 5,000 $ 4,400 $ 100 $ 4,300
(facility charge) remaining on deductible,
no other cost-sharing
Outpatient Surgery $ 1,500 $ 1,000 $ 15 copay $ 985
(physician charge)
TOTAL PATIENT COSTS $ 515 $ 5,285
OUT-OF-NETWORK SERVICES




Out-of-Network Services Charge Allowance Patient Pays Plan Pays
Outpatient Diagnostic Procedure $ 750 $ 400 $ 750 $ 0
(only $ 400 counted
toward deductible)
Outpatient Surgery $ 5,000 $ 4,400 $ 1,560 $ 3,440
(facility charge) ($100 left on deductible + 20% (80% of
of $4,300 + $600 difference $4,300)
between charge and allowance)
Outpatient Surgery  $ 1,500  $ 1,000  $ 640  $ 860
(physician charge) ($140 needed to reach
out-of-pocket limit + $500
difference between charge
and allowance)
TOTAL PATIENT COSTS  $ 2,950  $ 4,300
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If Zelda uses network providers, she pays the PPO’s contract price of
$400 for the diagnostic procedure. She pays $100 toward the facility
fee, meeting the remainder of her deductible, then pays $15 for the
surgeon’s service. If Zelda uses non-network providers, she pays the
full charge of $750 for the diagnostic procedure, but the plan only counts
$400 toward the deductible. For the facility fee, the plan allows $4,400.
Zelda pays the first $100, the plan pays 80 percent of the remaining
$4,300, and Zelda pays 20 percent of $4,300 plus the difference between
the facility’s charge and the allowed amount. So far, Zelda has spent
$2,310, well over the out-of-pocket limit. But the plan has only counted
$1,360, ignoring the amounts she has paid in excess of the plan’s maxi-
mum allowances. Therefore, for the surgeon’s fee, Zelda must pay $140
before the plan’s catastrophic protection kicks in. And she must still
pay the difference between the surgeon’s fee and the plan’s maximum
allowance for that service.
Thus a consumer trying to decide whether to obtain a service and whether
to use a network provider might need to know all three of the relevant
prices (charges, contract price, and maximum allowance) to make a fully
informed decision. On the other hand, a consumer who has met the de-
ductible and is content to stay within the network may not need to know
any prices at all to choose among network providers. Even if different
providers have different charges and contract prices, the consumer’s li-
ability may be a flat amount in a plan that imposes fixed co-payments
rather than coinsurance.
One recent development, tiered cost sharing for in-network services has
changed the calculations somewhat for participants in PPOs and other
network arrangements. Under a tiered system, the plan gives preferen-
tial treatment to some network providers—selected on the basis of some
form of price and quality scoring—over others. (Tiered arrangements
have long been common in prescription drug benefits, with lower cost-
sharing for generic and preferred brand-name drugs.) An enrollee using
the selected providers will pay a lower co-payment than one using other
network providers. In 2005, 13 percent of enrollees in employer group
PPO and POS plans, and 11 percent of those in HMOs, faced tiered cost-
sharing for medical services.7 While tiering can increase consumers’ price
sensitivity, it may also mean that consumers need even more informa-
tion to make rational decisions.
Consumer-directed health plans (CDHPs) — While there are many differ-
ent definitions of consumer-directed health care, two basic types of plans
account for most current enrollment. The first are plans developed to com-
ply with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization
Act (MMA) of 2003. These plans combine a high-deductible health plan
(HDHP) with a health savings account (HSA) funded through employer
and/or enrollee contributions. Within specified limits, the MMA allows
enrollees in qualified HDHPs to deduct their contributions to the HSA, and
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excludes employer contributions from employees’ taxable income. See text
box, below, for an explanation of how HDHP/HSA plans work.
The other common form of CDHP combines an employer health plan
(which may or may not be a high-deductible plan) with a health reim-
bursement arrangement (HRA). An HRA is similar to an HSA in some
respects and different in others. As with an HSA, the employer can make
tax-exempt contributions to an HRA; however, employees cannot supple-
ment these contributions with pre-tax dollars. Funds in an HRA can be
drawn on at any time to pay for medical expenses, but the employer is
free to decide what specific categories of expenses may be covered. HRAs
are usually “notional” accounts, meaning the employer isn’t actually de-
positing money anywhere but is simply crediting the worker with a speci-
fied amount to be made available as expenses are incurred. Whereas an
HSA belongs to the employee even if he or she changes jobs, workers may
HDHP
An HDHP must have a minimum deductible of
$1,100 for a self-only plan or $2,200 for a family plan.
Enrollees pay the entire cost for covered services
until they have satisfied the deductible. However,
the insurer may pay for some preventive care be-
fore the deductible is reached. Once an enrollee or
family has met the deductible, the plan may pay in
full for covered services or may require continued
cost sharing (such as 20 percent coinsurance). The
total amount paid by an enrollee for the deductible
and other cost sharing is subject to an out-of-pocket
limit, after which the HDHP pays 100 percent of
covered expenses. For 2007, the limit is $5,500 (in-
dividual) or $11,000 (family). A plan may have a
higher deductible than the minimum or a lower out-
of-pocket limit, but it may not have a lower deduct-
ible or higher out-of-pocket limit. Like other health
plans, an HDHP may have a network of participat-
ing providers and may require higher cost sharing
for out-of-network services.
HSA
An HSA is a savings account, similar to an IRA
(individual retirement account), held at a bank or
other financial institution. The sum of enrollee and
employer contributions to an HSA during a year
may not exceed $2,850 for an individual or $5,650
for a family. Funds may be withdrawn from the
HSA to pay for any qualified medical expense as
defined by the Internal Revenue Code, except that
the HSA may not be used to pay premiums for the
HDHP or most other types of insurance. Expenses
paid with HSA funds may include costs for ser-
vices that would not be covered under the HDHP
(for example, dental or vision care if the HDHP
excludes these services), although these services
would not count toward the deductible or out-of-
pocket limit. The unused balance in the HSA may
be carried over into later years. Interest or other
income is tax free, and withdrawals in the future
remain tax-exempt so long as they are used for
qualified expenses.
High-Deductible Health Plans and Health Savings Accounts
The following is a very brief description of the rules for tax-qualified HDHP/HSA plans; dollar amounts
noted are those in effect for 2007 and will be adjusted for inflation in subsequent years. (For a more
complete description of how HDHPs/HSAs work, see Beth Fuchs and Lisa Potetz, The Fundamentals of
Health Savings Accounts and High-Deductible Health Plans, National Health Policy Forum, forthcoming.)
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not always be able to continue drawing on an HRA balance after termi-
nating employment. In addition, the employer may or may not allow
workers to carry unused HRA balances into future years. HRA arrange-
ments are more commonly offered by large employer groups, while HSAs
are more prevalent in the small group and individual markets.
Enrollees in either type of arrangement commonly have access to some
form of provider network. One recent survey found that 95 percent of
insurers offering an HDHP/HSA or HDHP/HRA plan made the same
network available to enrollees in these plans and in the insurers’ tradi-
tional PPO or HMO plans.8 HDHPs commonly follow the same rules as
conventional PPOs, giving enrollees access to contract prices when they
use network providers and subjecting them to much higher costs for out-
of-network care. The relative costs for network and non-network use may
therefore resemble those shown above in the cost illustration for a tradi-
tional PPO enrollee. The only difference is that the HDHP enrollee faces a
higher deductible and out-of-pocket limit. Even this is not always true: in
2006, 8 percent of single enrollees in employer PPO plans faced a deduct-
ible of $1,000 or more, while 39 percent had an out-of-pocket limit greater
than $2,500 or no limit at all.9
Two factors affect the cost—real or perceived—of services for participants
in an HDHP/HSA plan. The first is the HSA itself. If the employer is con-
tributing to the HSA, some consumers may regard the care they receive as
“free” until the employer’s contribution is exhausted. In 2006, 30 percent
of enrollees in employer HDHP/HSA plans received no employer HSA
contribution. Employers who did pay into HSAs contributed an average
of $988 for single workers, while the average single deductible was $2,011,
leaving a gap of about $1,000 to be paid by the enrollee (directly or through
a tax-favored employee contribution to the HSA).10
Second, a surprisingly large number of HDHP/HSA plans require no co-
insurance payments after the deductible has been met. In 2004, 85.4
percent of individual HSA-eligible plans purchased through the online
vendor eHealthInsurance covered the full cost of in-network services above
the deductible.11 For an enrollee in one of these plans, the effective out-of-
pocket limit is identical to the deductible; the enrollee could incur addi-
tional costs after reaching the deductible only by using non-network pro-
viders or obtaining noncovered services.
Although enrollment in consumer-directed health plans has been grow-
ing, the vast majority of people with private health insurance are still in
traditional plans. As of January 2006, insurers reported about 3.2 million
enrollees in HDHP/HSA plans: 855,000 individual buyers, 1.4 million
group enrollees, and 878,000 enrollees who could not be classified as indi-
vidual or group. A 2006 survey of employers found that 4 percent of cov-
ered workers were in an HDHP with an HSA or HRA option. Enrollment
in HDHP/HSA group plans grew from 0.8 million workers in 2005 to 1.4
million in 2006. (This estimate does not include dependents.12)
Background Paper
March 28, 2007
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 11
PRICE INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS
Many insurers, providers, state and federal agencies, and other third-party
sources are beginning to make some form of price information available
to the general public or to members of a specific health plan, and there are
proposals to increase transparency of prices through voluntary or manda-
tory reporting requirements.
Types of Information Provided
Insurers or other sources are providing information about different kinds
of provider prices or ranges of prices. The following discussion provides a
few examples of each of the basic types of information being made avail-
able (usually on the Internet) and is not meant to be a catalogue of all
existing initiatives.
Provider charges — Some hospitals or other sources are now providing
information about charges (list prices) for inpatient, and sometimes outpa-
tient, services. No equivalent information appears to be available for charges
for services rendered by physicians or other nonhospital providers.
California requires hospitals to publish their standard lists of charges for
inpatient and outpatient services. These lists (known as chargemasters)
run for hundred of pages and can include nearly 25,000 individual prices
for such services as “leukopoor platelet pheresis” or “CT scan reformat-
ting 1 plane.” As consumers rarely know which or how many of these
services they might consume during an inpatient stay or outpatient visit,
these lists may be of little help. The hospitals also provide a short list of
charges for commonly used services, such as an echocardiogram, an in-
termediate emergency room visit, or a day of room and care in an inten-
sive care unit. These lists still tell consumers nothing about what they will
actually pay for the long list of items that might appear on their final bill.
Consumers might try to use the short charge list as a rough gauge of which
hospitals are more costly than others. They might be misled: charge lists
include different mark-ups over cost for different services.13 The hospital
with the lowest charges for the short-list services might have relatively
high charges for many other services. (Hospitals might even have an in-
centive to quote lower mark-ups on the short-list services.)
Several sources are providing aggregated data that might be more useful. In
Wisconsin, the WHA Information Center, a subsidiary of the state hospital
association, provides information on its Web site on total charges per hospi-
tal admission by diagnosis-related group or DRG. DRGs are the categories
Medicare and many other payers use to classify inpatient admissions by
diagnosis, complications, and/or procedures performed, for example, “car-
diac arrhythmia and conduction disorders with complications.” For each
hospital and DRG, the site lists number of discharges, length of stay, and
average and median charge; each hospital can be compared to all others in
the county or state or all others with a similar volume of cases. Louisiana
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Health Inform provides similar information on outpatient care, giving low,
high, and average charges for common ambulatory payment classifications
(APCs, the outpatient counterpart of DRGs).
As noted earlier, charge data are useful to enrollees in most plans only if
they are considering using an out-of-network provider. Moreover, hospi-
tal charge information excludes the separately billed charges for physi-
cian or other professional services furnished during an inpatient stay or
outpatient visit. Because a low-cost hospital might have high-cost physi-
cians, the hospital data give an incomplete comparison of total costs for
which a user might be liable. The issue of “global” costs is considered
further below (see “Evidence on Consumer Behavior” section).
Contract prices — Some health plans are beginning to provide informa-
tion about the actual contract prices they have negotiated with provid-
ers for selected procedures. CIGNA is providing average prices for some
outpatient procedures, such as colonoscopies and MRIs (magnetic reso-
nance imaging tests), at different facilities.14 Aetna has been providing
prices for a list of representative procedures (varying by specialty) for
each physician in Cincinnati and has begun to extend the project to a
few other localities. One obvious limitation of this
information is that patients usually come to a phy-
sician with some symptom or complaint, not look-
ing for a specific procedure. Even if they know
what major procedure they want, they cannot
predict what lab tests or other associated services
they might need. This might not be a problem if
insurers are uniformly paying some physicians
higher contract prices than others across all pro-
cedures, as appears to be the case in the Aetna price lists.15 Enrollees
could then get a general notion of which providers are more costly, even
if they couldn’t determine what mix of services they would be using.
Physicians point to another problem with posting contract prices: the pro-
cedures for which they bill the insurer are not necessarily the ones for
which they will be paid, because insurers will disallow some charges or
reclassify others. Humana has developed a system of real-time adjudica-
tion, under which a participating provider can submit a claim electroni-
cally and learn immediately what it will be paid and how much the
patient will owe. 16 (Similar systems are quite common for pharmacy ser-
vices.) This works only when the physician has the necessary linked com-
puter system and, in any case, lets consumers know their costs only after
services have been rendered, not when they are trying to choose a pro-
vider or decide what services to obtain.
A larger issue in posting negotiated prices is that the terms of insurer or
provider contracts are confidential; insurers, providers, or both may object
to contract prices being made public. Moreover, some economists con-
tend that publication of negotiated prices may have perverse effects on
One limitation of contract price informa-
tion as a tool for evaluating cost is that
patients usually come to a physician with
some symptom or complaint, not look-
ing for a specific procedure.
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competition; this question is considered further below (see “Required
Disclosure” section).
In June 2006, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) posted
data on Medicare payments to inpatient hospitals by state and county
for the most common DRGs and some others “deemed of interest to the
Medicare community.” Similar information for ambulatory surgery cen-
ters and common hospital outpatient and physician services was released
later in 2006. This information is of little use to Medicare beneficiaries
themselves, because their out-of-pocket costs for any given service do
not vary according to their choice of provider. CMS acknowledges this,
but suggests that “Medicare payment rates may provide a helpful bench-
mark, especially for uninsured individuals, to determine whether the
charges they see on a hospital bill bear any relationship to what third-
party fee-for-service payors pay to the hospital.”17 However, Medicare
payment rates are set using formulas that are uniform across providers;
the ratio of these rates to the prices negotiated by other carriers is likely
to vary from provider to provider. Even for a single provider, the ratio
may not be constant for different services.
Maximum allowances — A health plan enrollee considering using a non-
network provider, or an enrollee in a plan with no network, needs to know
both the individual provider’s charges and the insurer’s maximum allow-
ance for the service. The federal TRICARE program, which serves active
and retired military personnel and their families, now posts its maximum
allowable payments by geographic area for numerous physician services
online.18 It does not provide information on nonparticipating providers’
charges, but TRICARE enrollees may not need this information, because
the program strictly limits balance billing.
Insurers could help enrollees evaluate non-network costs by publishing
their own maximum allowances for specific services. However, insurers
have historically been reluctant to reveal their maximum allowances,
because this could undermine their negotiations with network provid-
ers and because of concerns of possible manipulation by non-network
providers (for example, billing for the procedure code with the higher
allowance). Insurers might also be able to report what non-network pro-
viders in an area are typically charging for various services. However,
any one insurer could assemble charge information only if its enrollees
were frequently using specific non-network providers and, because pro-
viders can change their charges at any time, any information might rap-
idly become obsolete.
Episode costs — Even if a consumer had full information about provid-
ers’ charges and contract prices and about insurers’ maximum allow-
ances for every procedure, this might not be enough to establish which
providers are more or less costly. A given physician might charge less
than others for office visits, but order a great many more tests. In addi-
tion, medical care often involves multiple providers: the patient presents
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a problem to primary physician A, who refers the patient to specialist B,
who recommends that surgeon C perform a procedure at facility D. Know-
ing what physician A charges for visits or procedures tells the patient noth-
ing about the likely ultimate cost of care for the entire episode of illness.
In theory, the patient could break the chain
of connections among providers. When phy-
sician A recommends physician B, the pa-
tient could go home and see if there’s some
other less costly specialist available. The
patient could suggest that the surgeon use
less costly facility E instead of D. However,
because practitioners may have established
ties to particular facilities, this might require dramatic changes in the
organization of medical practice and thus be unlikely to happen. In the
current system, patients trying to make provider choices on the basis of
price or quality may need some way of comparing the whole, loosely
connected set of providers A-B-C-D to some alternative set, E-F-G-H or
I-J-K-L. The original concept of managed competition assumed just this
sort of comparison: the consumer would choose between health plans
whose premium costs would reflect the relative efficiency of their affili-
ated provider networks. However, health plans may now contract with
most providers in a community, and consumer-directed care is designed
to shift the focus of competition from the level of health plans to the
level of providers.
A number of measurement systems have been developed that attempt to
capture differences among providers in overall spending for an entire epi-
sode of care. These include Symmetry’s episode treatment groups (ETGs),
Medstat episode groups (MEGs), and the Cave Marketbasket System. Each
of these systems collects claims information from all the providers involved
in treating a defined episode. ETGs and MEGs report costs by individual
provider and type of episode—for example, “coronary disease, without
acute myocardial infarction, with cardiac catheterization.” A cardiologist
treating many kinds of cases could have a different score for each kind. The
Cave Marketbasket provides a single overall score for each provider, ad-
justing the data to show how costs would compare if each provider saw the
same mix of cases. (The systems also aim to develop effectiveness or out-
come scores, in addition to price comparisons.)
To be useful and credible to patients, insurers, and providers, any system
must meet some basic tests:19
■ There must be enough cases to allow reliable estimates for each pro-
vider. This may not be possible, especially at the individual practitio-
ner level, when the system uses claims data from a single insurer.
■ There must be a method to adjust for case mix, in the event that some
providers are treating patients who are more seriously ill or who have
several complicating conditions.
Even if a consumer had full information
about providers’ charges, contract prices, and
maximum allowances, this might not be
enough to establish which providers are
more or less costly.
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■ There must be an acceptable way of attributing the cost or quality score
to one of the many providers a patient may have seen during an epi-
sode. This isn’t a problem if providers A-B-C-D consistently work to-
gether. But what if provider A sometimes refers patients to B-C-D and
sometimes to less efficient E-F-G? Should A be scored on the basis of
their performance?
A preliminary analysis of two of the systems by MedPAC has found that
they are useful tools for examining resource use. However, providers—
perhaps especially individual practitioners—are likely to question the
adequacy or fairness of the methods for case mix adjustment and pro-
vider attribution. Perhaps more important, MedPAC had access to the very
large samples available in Medicare data. Insurers and employers have
been pressing CMS to release similar Medicare data to them, so that they
can conduct their own assessments of individual provider efficiency and
quality, but CMS has so far declined on confidentiality grounds.20 Massa-
chusetts is now preparing to grant researchers access to an inpatient hos-
pital admission database that includes physician identifiers and that could
be used to develop utilization and cost profiles at the individual physician
level.21 Blue Cross Blue Shield Plans, which have announced a national
data collection initiative, may have sufficient market share in many geo-
graphic areas to produce meaningful numbers at the practitioner level.22
So far, no insurer is reporting individual providers’ episode cost scores di-
rectly to members. Aetna and Humana are using a mix of ETG and Cave
price and quality scores as one of the criteria in selecting the favored pro-
viders in plans with tiered cost sharing. In a few localities, Aetna members
can learn whether a particular favored physician has met Aetna’s efficiency
criteria, which compare a physician’s case mix adjusted total resource use
to that of similar specialists in the area. Actual scores are not disclosed.
Several insurers, including Aetna and PacifiCare, provide members with
information on average total costs for some types of episodes, by geographic
area instead of specific provider.
Table 2 (above, right)  shows
the Aetna estimates for “high-
severity heart failure” in one
Pennsylvania county in 2006.
The Federal Employees Health
Benefits (FEHB) Program is ask-
ing its participating health plans
to provide similar information
beginning in 2007. Each plan
would make data available to
enrollees in a format similar to
that shown in Table 3.
While these data are only aver-









Medical Tests $ 1,587
Total Annual Costs $ 9,869
Source: Aetna (members-only Web site),
May 9, 2006.
TABLE 3
Proposed Format for Disclosure of
Average Estimated Costs by an Insurer
Participating in the FEHB Program
Inpatient /
Procedure Network Non-network Outpatient
Breast Biopsy $  2,000 $   3,400 OP
Colonoscopy $  1,500 $   2,500 OP
Inguinal Hernia Repair $  3,800 $   7,900 OP
Hysterectomy $  8,300 $ 21,200 IP
Arthroscopy Knee / Shoulder $  4,200 $   9,700 OP
Source: U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Employees Health Benefits Program Call
Letter, FEHBP Program Carrier Letter 2006-09, April 4, 2006.
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enrollees some idea of what they would be risking if they chose to go out
of network (though it is unclear whether the figures in the non-network
column are supposed to represent average charges or the insurer’s maxi-
mum allowance for the service). In addition, if enrollees are considering
alternative treatment options, data might indicate the relative costs of dif-
ferent courses of care. However, the figures would not help an enrollee
choose from among in-network providers.
Availability and Consumer Use
of Price Information
In a 2005 survey of insurers selling HSA or HRA plans, 56 percent re-
ported that they were making some form of cost information available
to enrollees.23 (No equivalent information is available about the infor-
mation provided by insurers selling traditional PPO or other plans, al-
though many of the surveyed entities are probably in both markets.)
Figure 1 gives some details about the types of information insurers are
reporting. Most are providing area-wide averages or ranges of costs,
rather than costs at particular providers. In addition, costs tend to be
reported for specific procedures, rather than for total episodes of care.
When health plan enrollees, as opposed to insurers, are surveyed, they
are much less likely to report that their plan is providing cost information.
In one 2006 survey, only 22 to 27 percent of enrollees in HDHPs or CDHPs,




































Scope and Types of Provider and Cost Information Reported
by Insurers Offering HSA or HRA Plans, 2005
Source: Reden and Anders, Ltd.,
Consumer Directed Insurance
Products: Survey Results, survey
conducted for the American Hospital
Association and the Federation of
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provided on doctors and/or hos-
pitals.24 Some of the disparity pre-
sumably reflects the different
samples, but there may be two
other factors. First, some plan en-
rollees may not be aware of all the
information available from their
insurer’s Web site or other publi-
cations. (A different survey found
that 62 percent of CDHP enrollees
knew that their plan made pro-
vider information available on its
Web site.25) Second, some enroll-
ees may not regard the general or
average data provided by many
plans as constituting meaningful
cost information.
Of enrollees who reported that
their plan furnished cost informa-
tion, those in high-deductible
plans, with or without an HRA or
HSA account, were somewhat less
likely to have “tried to use it” than
those in traditional employer plans
(Figure 2). Another survey found
the reverse; 20 percent of enrollees
in consumer-directed plans had
sought information—whether from the plan or any other source—on the
cost of physician visits, compared with 14 percent of enrollees in tradi-
tional plans. A third survey found that enrollees in CDHPs and other em-
ployer plans were equally likely to have used their plans’ Web sites to
compare the cost of providers; just 5 percent of enrollees in each group
had done so.26
PROMOTING GREATER TRANSPARENCY
While there are many voluntary initiatives to make price information avail-
able to consumers, there is also growing interest in the possibility of
federal action to require providers and/or purchasers to publish specific
information. Other proposals would go further, by requiring some form
of standardization to make prices more easily understandable or fairer.
Required Disclosure
An Executive Order issued by President Bush on August 22, 2006, estab-
lished new standards for quality improvement and data interoperability for

















* Comprehensive plans had no deductible or a deductible less than $1,000 (individual) or $2,000 (family).
Source: Paul Fronstin and Sara R. Collins, The 2nd Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Con-
sumerism in Health Care Survey, 2006: Early Experience With High-Deductible and Consumer-
Driven Health Plans, Employee Benefit Research Institute issue brief 300, December 2006; available
at www.cmwf.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=430598.
FIGURE 2
Percentage of Enrollees in Plans Providing Cost
Information Who Tried to Use That Information,
by Type of Plan and Provider, 2006
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and Veterans Affairs, but not Medicaid). One provision requires agencies
administering these programs to make “the prices they pay for procedures”
available to program participants and, optionally, to the public. Prices to be
disclosed include those paid to participating providers by health plans con-
tracting with the federal programs. Agencies are also directed to work with
other stakeholders to develop episode-level cost information.27
The agencies have not yet announced how this order will be implemented.
As suggested earlier, reporting of direct provider payment rates paid by
Medicare or other agencies may not be especially useful to the general
public or even program beneficiaries. However, most major health plans
in the large group market also contract with Medicare, the FEHB Program,
or both. The order could be read as requiring these plans to disclose every
negotiated price with every individual provider in their networks. While
the information might be made available only to the plans’ federal enroll-
ees, it is doubtful that rate schedules would remain confidential for very
long. Moreover, as plans are unlikely to negotiate separate prices for fed-
eral and private enrollees, the result could be that most people with pri-
vate coverage would know all the rates their plans are paying. On the
other hand, agencies might adopt a less sweeping interpretation of the
vague phrase “the prices they pay,” requiring that plans disclose only av-
erage or median payment rates. The reporting would then be similar to
the benchmark information the FEHB Program has already asked its plans
to make available.
In 2003, the Department of Health Human Services (HHS) Office of the
Inspector General proposed new rules intended to help Medicare detect
when providers were billing Medicare more than their usual charges to
other payers.28 To justify their billed Medicare charges, providers would
have been required to report the median amounts actually accepted from
private payers—net of any contractual discounts—for each procedure or
service. While this rule was never finalized, at one point in the legislative
process a comparable requirement was inserted in the Health Information
Technology Promotion Act (H.R. 4157) passed by the House of Represen-
tatives in July 2006. (The requirement was included in the version of the
bill considered by the House Committee on Rules but was dropped from
the version reported by the Committee to the full House.) For selected
procedures, the hospitals would have been required to report to HHS the
range of prices charged to or paid by Medicare, Medicaid, other public
insurance programs, private insurers, other insurers, and self-pay patients.
Reporting would have been by class of payer; for example, a hospital would
have been required to report price ranges paid by all private insurers, but
not the specific prices paid by different plans.
While disclosure of the prices negotiated by health plans and providers
might be helpful to consumers, there is some debate about the possible
effects on competition among providers and/or health plans. Suppose
that all hospitals and health plans in an area knew all the prices paid for
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a given procedure. If a hospital learned that a given insurer was paying
other hospitals more for the procedure than it was receiving, it might
demand the higher price. Conversely, if a health plan learned that a hos-
pital had granted steeper discounts to competing insurers, it might ask
for the same discount.
Whether providers or health plans would prevail in this
scenario would depend on which had the greater bargain-
ing power. Some observers believe that, because of the
growing degree of concentration in the hospital sector—
some areas are served by only two or three major hospi-
tal systems—full transparency might mean that hospital rates would ac-
tually rise.29 (Aetna reports that its publication of negotiated physician
prices has not yet led many physicians to ask to renegotiate rates.30) On
the other hand, physicians argue that it is the insurance industry which is
growing more concentrated, with a handful of insurers serving most of
the population in some areas.31 In these markets, general disclosure of
negotiated rates might be expected to drive prices down. Whether there
exists an oligopoly of a few providers or an oligopsony of a few insurers,
regulators have always been concerned about the anticompetitive effects
of shared price information. Transparency could be seen as institutional-
izing what has in the past been a private (and perhaps, under antitrust
law, illegal) exchange of data.
Standardized Pricing
Because providers may quote charges or prices for many different pro-
cedures or services, and because consumers cannot know exactly which
services they will consume, some analysts have suggested some form of
standardization that would make it easier for consumers to compare the
relative costs of using different providers.
One option would be to require providers to quote a standard price unit
for all the services they furnish.32 Under the Medicare resource-based
relative value scale (RBRVS), different physician services are assigned
different relative weights; for example, in 2007 an office visit for a minor
problem has a weight of 1.02, while an echocardiogram exam has a weight
of 5.4. Medicare multiplies this weight by a unit price, known as the
conversion factor, set nationally at $37.8975 for 2007. Thus a physician
would be paid $38.66 for the office visit and $204.65 for the
echocardiogram. (Actual payment amounts vary by geographic area. For
a more detailed explanation of the RBRVS, see Laura A. Dummit, “Up-
dating Medicare’s Physician Fees: The Sustainable Growth Rate Meth-
odology,” National Health Policy Forum.33) Under the standardization
proposal, each physician would set his or her own unit price for private
patients, but would then use Medicare’s relative weights to determine
the specific price for each possible service. For example, a surgeon who
quoted a $50 multiplier would charge $51 for the office visit and $270 for
Regulators have always been con-
cerned about the anticompetitive
effects of shared price information.
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the echocardiogram. Physicians might have different multipliers for dif-
ferent payers—say, $40 for self-pay patients and $30 for enrollees in Acme
Health Plan, but patients with a given type of coverage could clearly see
which available providers were more expensive.
Another proposal would go further and would require that providers ac-
cept the same price from every purchaser: self-pay patients, insurers, and
even Medicare and Medicaid.34 Some states have in the past had “all-payer”
systems, which required hospitals to accept the same rates for every pa-
tient; Maryland’s is the last of these systems still operational. In all cases,
these states established the rates through regulation or negotiation. Under
this proposal, however, providers would set their own rates, so long as
they were uniform for all purchasers.
Because this specific proposal includes Medicare and Medicaid, it would
require redesign of payment systems and could potentially have a major
impact on public spending—if, as providers allege, public program ben-
eficiaries are often subsidized by the privately insured. A less sweeping
option might apply to private payers only: that is, providers would have
the same price for all insured and self-pay patients, without the large dis-
counts some insurers may obtain. The authors of the proposal contend
that the cost of providing a service does not depend on who is paying for
it, and that there is thus no justification for differential pricing.35 Perhaps
more important, the practice of giving different insurers different discounts
means that price competition remains at the level of health plans—insur-
ers that command bigger discounts can offer lower premiums—instead of
at the level of providers, which some proponents of competition would
prefer. Finally, any form of all-payer price system may competitively dis-
advantage providers who have high costs because they furnish charity
care, train residents, or conduct clinical research; other ways might need
to be found to finance these social goods.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF
GREATER PRICE TRANSPARENCY
Proponents of greater transparency in health care pricing contend that
informed consumers will be more likely to shop for better values and that
providers will respond by competing on price and quality. Others say that
these effects are likely to be limited, for at least two reasons. First, because
health care decisions are complicated and are often made quickly or at
times of great personal stress, consumers may not be able or willing to
shop for medical care in the same way they do for other goods and ser-
vices. Second, the financial incentives for price-shopping may not be very
strong. Even HDHPs, because of their benefit structure and use of pro-
vider networks, leave enrollees exposed to only a fraction of their true
costs, reducing the pressure to look for bargains.
This section begins with a review of the evidence—including limited expe-
rience from consumer-directed plans—on how financial incentives affect
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care-seeking behavior. It then discusses the
incentives for price-shopping under currently
available consumer-directed plans.
Evidence on Consumer Behavior
There is an extensive literature showing that,
when consumers pay more of their own
health care expenses, they obtain fewer ser-
vices and incur lower overall costs than con-
sumers with comprehensive, “first-dollar”
coverage. The most commonly cited study
is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
conducted nearly 30 years ago (see box,
right). While health care and health insur-
ance have changed markedly since then, this
comprehensive experiment was costly and
has never been repeated. More recent,
smaller-scale studies have shown similar ef-
fects. Cost sharing leads people to reduce
utilization and overall spending.36 It may
deter use of unnecessary services but may
prevent consumers from seeking care for
more serious symptoms.37 It may also reduce
use of preventive services such as
mammograms;38 it is for this reason that the
MMA provisions for HDHP/HSA plans al-
low insurers to pay for preventive services
for enrollees who have not yet met the
HDHP deductible.
Because consumer-directed health plans are
still quite new, there have only been a few
independent studies of their effects on con-
sumer behavior. Some other studies, not
summarized here, have examined changes
in spending levels but not the behaviors that
led to those changes.39 And nothing is yet
known about the effects of CDHPs on qual-
ity or outcomes of care.
Kaiser Foundation — A survey of enrollees
in CDHPs and other employer plans found
that 71 percent of CDHP enrollees agreed
with the statement, “The terms of my health
plan make me consider cost when deciding
to see a doctor or fill a prescription,”
compared with 49 percent of non-CDHP
The Health Insurance Experiment
The Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) was conducted
by the RAND Corporation, with funding from HHS, be-
tween 1974 and 1982. The HIE randomly assigned 5,809
enrollees to a variety of health insurance plans, including
a plan that included no cost-sharing (the “free” plan) and
plans requiring coinsurance payments of 25 percent, 50
percent, or 95 percent (subject to income-based limits on
total out-of-pocket expenditures).
The key findings of the HIE were these:*
Cost sharing reduced the probability that
individuals would seek care for any particu-
lar medical condition.
The strongest deterrent effects occurred among the poor,
especially poor children. They were at least 40 percent
less likely to obtain care for a given problem than chil-
dren in the free plan. However, there were reductions in
utilization for all income groups.
Cost sharing deterred enrollees from
obtaining both “appropriate” and “inap-
propriate” medical care.
Low-income enrollees in the cost-sharing plans were less
likely to seek care for conditions for which medical care is
highly effective as well as for conditions for which medi-
cal care is rarely effective. In a few instances, such as con-
trol of high blood pressure, those in the cost-
sharing plans had worse medical outcomes than those in
the free plan, but outcomes did not vary significantly on
most other measures.
While cost-sharing prevented enrollees
from initiating an episode of medical care,
it did not change the course of treatment
once an individual had entered the medi-
cal care system.
For any given type of inpatient admission or ambulatory
episode of care, total spending for the enrollees in high cost-
sharing plans was the same as for other study participants.
*Emmett B. Keeler and John E. Rolph, “How Cost Sharing Reduced Medical
Spending of Participants in the Health Insurance Experiment,” Journal of the
American Medical Association, 249, no. 16 (April 22, 1983): pp. 2220–2222,
and Kathleen N. Lohr et al., “Use of Medical Care in the Rand Health Insur-
ance Experiment,” Medical Care,  24, no. 9, supplement (September 1986):
ch. 8, pp. S72–S87.
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enrollees. CDHP enrollees were more likely to ask about visit costs or alter-
native treatments and to choose a lower-cost treatment option.40
Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)/Commonwealth — A sur-
vey of people in HDHP and comprehensive plans found little difference
in utilization, even within specific income and health status groups. How-
ever, one-third of people with an HDHP reported delaying or avoiding
care, compared with 17 percent in comprehensive plans. Among people
in fair or poor health or with a chronic condition, 40 percent of HDHP
enrollees delayed or avoided care, compared with 21 percent of enrollees
in comprehensive plans.41
University of Oregon — People who switched from a PPO to a lower-
deductible or higher-deductible HDHP/HRA plan were more likely than
non-switchers to begin engaging in what the authors characterize as “risky”
cost-saving behaviors, such as not going to the doctor when they thought
they should, delaying a procedure or surgery, or deciding to have a less
expensive diagnostic test. The study also measured the rates of “unpro-
ductive” medical visits (a concept similar to the HIE’s “inappropriate”
care). Use of such visits dropped only for people switching to the lower
deductible ($2,000) HDHP plan; use by people in the higher-deductible
($3,000) plan went unchanged.42
McKinsey — Enrollees in “full replacement” plans—cases in which an
employer switched everyone from comprehensive coverage to an HDHP/
HRA— were twice as likely as other enrollees to forgo all care when they
regarded their condition as “not very serious”; there was no statistically
significant difference for conditions regarded as “somewhat” or “very”
serious.43 There was evidence that enrollees shifted to more cost-effective
settings for some care; for example, use of urgent care centers rose and
use of emergency rooms dropped.
University of Minnesota — Enrollees who switched from a PPO or HMO
to an HDHP/HRA plan had lower case-mix adjusted total and out-of-
pocket spending than non-switchers in the year before changing plans.
Within two years, however, their spending levels approached those of
people remaining in the PPO and were higher than those of people in the
HMO.44 These unexpected results might be atypical because the HDHP
had a fairly small gap between the employer’s HRA contribution and the
deductible and because the plan paid 100 percent for in-network services
above the deductible. One commenter also argues that the results for the
small sample could have been distorted by a few high-cost outliers.45
Although the early results are mixed, they generally support the view that
high-deductible plans can reduce “moral hazard”—the tendency of people
with insurance to seek more care than they would if they had to pay for it
themselves—and may lead some people to choose less costly treatment
options. However, none of these studies shows that consumers will actu-
ally shop for better prices for specific health care services.
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A consumer with a health problem or concern must (a) decide whether
to seek care at all, may then (b) choose among different possible treat-
ment courses, and might then (c) learn which provider offers the best
price and quality for the selected treatment option. The distinctions
among these three kinds of choices may often be fuzzy, especially when
services are bundled or globally priced. For example, a hospital offering
a lower price for an inpatient stay might provide different treatment from
its competitor or might be supplying the same treatment at a lower cost.
Still, there are many cases in which decisions about treatments are clearly
separable from price choices.
Consider a patient found to have prostate cancer. An
older patient or one with early-stage disease might
choose watchful waiting, that is, no treatment at all
unless the disease advances. A patient who decides to
obtain treatment may choose between surgery or ra-
diation therapy (with or without associated hormone therapy). Hav-
ing decided on surgery, the patient might then look for the surgeon
offering the best price for a prostatectomy. The cost of care might cer-
tainly (and perhaps sometimes inappropriately) be a factor in the first
two decisions, as could other “opportunity costs”—for example, a pa-
tient might feel that he cannot afford to miss work during a weeks-
long course of radiation. But only the third kind of decision, in which
the patient directly considers which provider offers the best value, is
likely to promote the price competition—one of the ostensible goals of
consumer-directed care.46
That studies so far have not found evidence of price-shopping does
not mean that it might not occur. The studies were not designed to
measure these effects, and lack of price information or limited incen-
tives for shopping in first-generation HDHPs may have prevented be-
havioral changes that would emerge in a fully informed population
with stronger incentives. One possible way of learning about shopping
behavior would be to look at services that are generally not covered by
insurance at all and are paid for entirely out of pocket. One recent study
examined purchases of LASIK eye surgery, in vitro fertilization, cos-
metic rhinoplasty, and dental crowns. The authors found no evidence
of price-shopping; people went to the provider recommended by a
physician or friends (or, for crowns, they used their usual dentist).
However, price comparisons for these services may be difficult, because
a provider may not quote a price for a particular patient without hav-
ing conducted an initial screening exam. So obtaining multiple “bids”
could be costly and time-consuming.47
In the absence of hard evidence, there has been a long-running theoretical
debate over whether, given sufficient incentives and information, people
could be induced to shop for medical care as they do for other goods and
That studies so far have not found
evidence of price-shopping does not
mean that it might not occur.
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services, or whether medical care is fundamentally different. One of the
earliest and most influential studies in health economics, a 1963 article by
Kenneth Arrow, identified a number of characteristics of the medical mar-
ket that make it different from other markets.48 Perhaps the most important
for this discussion is “asymmetry of information.” People buy medical care
infrequently, they know little about it, and they rely on their physicians—
who presumably know more and are supposed to be acting in the patient’s
interest—to make purchasing decisions for them.
Some people contend that the world has changed since 1963: new in-
formation sources have already made patients much better equipped
to evaluate treatment choices and compare available providers. How-
ever, the very proliferation of information may leave consumers un-
certain whom to trust; there are so many Web sites offering treatment
advice and comparisons of providers that there have now emerged
health Web sites that just evaluate other Web sites. In addition, there is
still much progress to be made in developing
meaningful and accessible measures that will let
consumers balance quality as well as price in se-
lecting among providers.49
Even if adequate price and quality information is
available, patients with a serious medical problem
might not be able or inclined to process informa-
tion and make complex choices. And there is a time element: patients
may not be able to delay care while they conduct the sort of comprehen-
sive review of options they might undertake when buying a car.50
A more optimistic view is that shopping may be more practical for some
kinds of services than others. One recent analysis distinguishes between
“experience goods”—things that people buy again and again, like break-
fast cereal—and “credence goods,” things people may buy rarely or only
once in a lifetime. For experience goods, people develop their own prefer-
ences over time, while buyers of credence goods must fall back on a trusted
agent (such as the physician) or on reputation (as when friends recom-
mend a provider).51 It could be that competition is more likely to emerge
for the kinds of medical care that people buy often, such as pediatric care,
prescription drugs for common conditions, and routine care for persons
with chronic conditions.52 This competition might or might not produce
substantial system-wide savings; the share of total health spending af-
fected may depend on exactly which services might be considered experi-
ence goods. Still, it could be that market competition would emerge in at
least some health sectors.
Finally, physicians themselves could play a more active role in helping
their patients select providers. Currently it is uncommon for physicians
and patients to discuss costs at all.53 But some people believe physicians
might become more proactive if the growth in HDHPs means that their
Price shopping may be most practical
for services that consumers buy often,
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patients, rather than insurers, are likely to be at financial risk.54 This could,
in turn, mean that physicians would become more conscious of the costs
and benefits of the services and providers they recommend to patients
with traditional coverage.
Financial Incentives
Many people have questioned whether consumer-directed plans can have
a significant effect on overall costs because so much of total health care
spending is for the small number of people who will exceed the plans’
out-of-pocket limits and then have no incentive to control their spending.
(This issue could be addressed by setting a higher limit or requiring some
continued coinsurance, but only at the risk of burdening very vulnerable
patients.) If enough people with more modest expenditures begin to con-
sider prices, at least for very common services, real price competition might
develop. However, two key features of standard HDHP/HSA arrange-
ments limit the incentives for participants to give much weight to the cost
of specific services.
Possible effects of HSAs and HRAs on price sensitivity — As noted ear-
lier, the availability of an employer-funded HSA or HRA can mean that
some HDHP enrollees have limited cost exposure. The employer pays for
care up to the limit of the HSA/HRA contribution, the employee pays up
to the deductible, and then the insurer assumes some or all responsibility
for any remainder. Some employers have set high initial contribution lev-
els, partly to cushion the transition to HDHPs. If the gap between the
employer’s contribution and the deductible is small, this may dampen
any incentive for price-shopping.
Even without an employer contribution, the tax benefits for a self-funded
employee or individual HSA reduce the effective costs of services pur-
chased with it, especially for higher-income participants. For someone
in the lowest federal tax bracket in a state without an income tax, the
HSA reduces the effective price of a service by 10 percent. For someone
in the highest federal bracket in a state with a steeply progressive in-
come tax, the HSA can reduce the effective price by as much as 45 per-
cent.55 If two providers have different prices, the high-income taxpayer
would pay only about half the difference. The Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO) has reviewed a sample of tax returns from taxpayers
enrolled in an HSA-eligible plan in 2004 (Figure 3, see next page). Aver-
age HSA contributions are highest for high-income taxpayers, meaning
HSAs may actually reduce price sensitivity for people who might not
have been especially price-sensitive in the first place.56
It is conceivable that account holders would still consider prices because
they would want to conserve their accounts for possible medical needs in
future years. However, many people may not be so prudent. In the Uni-
versity of Minnesota study cited earlier, 60 percent of participants with an
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HRA that allowed year-to-year carry over of unused funds had used up
their accounts by the end of the first year, and 72 percent by the end of the
second year.57 The effects might be different for HSAs, which allow life-
time portability. One study of enrollees in an HSA arrangement found
that only 46 percent used up their account in the first year.58 Similarly, the
GAO study found that only 45 percent of taxpayers who contributed to an
HSA in 2004 withdrew any funds during that year.59
Network prices — Most plans offer enrollees access to negotiated net-
work prices. For physician and other ambulatory services, these may not
vary widely for a particular insurer in a particular community. For ex-
ample, an Aetna enrollee in Toledo, Ohio, in need of an inguinal hernia
repair would see physician contract prices ranging from $458.33 to
$527.07—a difference of $68.74.60 If the enrollee had already met the de-
ductible for the year and was in a plan with 20 percent coinsurance, the
price difference would shrink to just $14, surely too little to outweigh such
other considerations as convenience or the provider’s reputation. And
many HDHP plans require no further cost-sharing after the deductible,
reducing the consumer’s share of the price difference to zero.
Of course, enrollees would see much bigger price differences if they con-






















Average Income Tax Deduction Claimed for HSA Contribution, 2004
Source: Adapted from U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), Consumer Directed Health Plans: Early Enrollee Ex-
periences with Health Savings Accounts and Eligible Health
Plans, GAO-06-798, August 2006; available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06798.pdf.
* HSA deductions represent the amount individuals claimed they,
or someone other than their employer, contributed to their
HSA. Deductions do not include employer contributions, al-
though employers may contribute to employees’ HSAs. Aver-
age deduction amounts do not include HSA contributions indi-
viduals may have made through pretax payroll deductions and
therefore may understate the amount individuals contributed
to their HSAs. In 2004, most HSA-eligible plan enrollees pur-
chased coverage in the individual market rather than obtain-
ing coverage through an employer. These data are reported on
a per-return basis and thus could include contributions to more
than one HSA in some instances. Moreover, the data do not
distinguish between deductions claimed for HSA contributions
made by enrollees with single and family coverage or between
HSA-eligible coverage obtained in the group and individual
market. The maximum allowable HSA contribution in 2004
was $2,600 for single coverage and $5,150 for family cover-
age; account holders aged 55 or over and not enrolled in Medi-
care could contribute an additional $500.
** Adjusted gross income may include income earned by family
members who are not covered under HSA-eligible plans.
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for doing so may be so large as to make this option simply unthinkable,
except for the least costly services. There are also likely to be substantial
differences among network hospitals in negotiated prices for comparable
services. However, because cost sharing for a single admission could im-
mediately take many patients to the out-of-pocket limit, patients would
have the same final cost regardless of which facility they chose. (One sug-
gested solution is to change the rules so that patients who had reached the
out-of-pocket limit would still be responsible for some share of the cost
difference for low-priced and high-priced providers.61)
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS:
THE ROLE OF HEALTH PLANS
For proponents of consumer-directed plans, the availability of networks
presents something of a paradox. Without access to network prices, people
shifting to HDHPs would suddenly find themselves paying full charges.
Over time, if a large share of consumers were in HDHPs without net-
works, providers’ “list price” charges to these consumers might drop to
more realistic levels. But non-network HDHPs are unlikely to gain a suffi-
cient market share for this to occur, precisely because people who joined
them would suffer immediate sticker shock.
In addition, the hope in some quarters that consumers could replace insur-
ers at the bargaining table might not be realized. Some people think that
insurers will always be able to command better prices than individual pa-
tients. Even if insurers have had to broaden their networks to satisfy enroll-
ees’ desire for greater choice—some now include 80 to 90 percent of provid-
ers in a community—their ability to threaten providers with exclusion will
still give the insurers greater bargaining power than any single consumer.62
But the persistence of network-negotiated prices could reduce support for
the concept of consumer-driven care by provider groups that were hoping
to stop dealing with insurers and instead deal directly with patients.
Meanwhile, the strong incentives to stay in-network reduce the consumer
autonomy the new models were supposed to promote. One survey shows
that enrollees in consumer-driven plans are even less satisfied with their
choice of providers than enrollees in traditional plans,63 perhaps in part
because one of the selling points of the new options was that they were
supposed to free participants from network restrictions.
Finally, whatever the progress toward price transparency (and its elu-
sive companion, reliable quality reporting), it may be a very long time
before consumers are really equipped to make complex decisions about
price and quality in medical care. Some observers hope that health plans
could evolve to assume the “trusted agent” role once occupied by per-
sonal physicians.64 Does this conflict with the goal of consumerism? One
analyst argues that, while people don’t use agents when they want to
buy cereal, they often do when they want to buy mutual funds; agency
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and consumer autonomy are not necessarily incompatible.65 Still, to the
extent that interest in consumerism has been driven in part by the “man-
aged care backlash,” fixing the troubled marriage of health plans and
enrollees may be a long process.
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